MANAGING CULTURE AT BRITISH AIRWAYS: HYPE, HOPE AND REALITY
Today, nearly twenty years after the publication of the (in)famous In Search of Excellence, t h e n o t i o n o f ' c u l t u r a l c h a n g e ' wi t h i n o r g a n i s a t i o n s c o n t i n u e s t o e x c i t e attention. This continuing attraction is readily understood, since cultural interventions offer practitioners the hope of a universal panacea to organisational ills and academics an explanatory framework that enjoys the virtues of being both partially true and gloriously simple. Such a combination is apparent in the way that many attempts to shape organisational culture are presented to the public: as simple stories with happy endings. 6, 7 To a certain extent, of course, any form of narration encourages a story, an ending, and, as a result, a simplification and stories may be used to shed light on attitudes and understandings not otherwise easily available to the researcher. But there is a very significant difference between listening to the accounts that individuals tell in order to make sense of their lives and allowing the study of the workplace to become ' f i c t i o n a l i s e d ' . T h e f o r me r i n v o l v e s e n g a g i n g wi t h t h e ' s u b j e c t s ' o f t h e r e s e a r c h , attempting to understand their world view and allowing them a voice in the process they are participating in. The latter can mean a selective reading of the data with examples chosen because they illustrate pre-set conclusions.
In management particularly the capacity of writers to turn case studies into celebratory fictions is worrying. As Marchington 8 argues, too many texts focus on " f a i r y t a l e s a n d ma g i c wa n d s " . S u c h a n e mp h a s i s e n c o u r a g e s t h e b e l i e f t h a t wh a t i s important in the workplace is not context, structure, power, economics or industrial relations but whatever new initiative management have chosen to introduce (the "magic wands"). The form that this magic takes varies from intervention to intervention but the impact claimed for each is curiously similar with unproductive workplaces turned around and reluctant employees transformed into enthusiasts. Any changes that take place are seen to be a direct result of the magic and most are exaggerated. As a result, research into management becomes research into a series of fads and fashions with Total Quality Management or Business Process Reengineering or empowerment or culture vying for attention and every intervention presented as new. So academic understanding of the workplace starts afresh each time a guru develops a new magic wand. Lessons cannot be carried forward since BPR is not employee involvement and company culture is not TQM. Elements of the workplace that might have provided a crucial element of continuity are ignored or dismissed as unimportant since only change is magical. As a result, by relying on these accounts, we understand less and less about why organisations function in the way that they do and practitioners are encouraged to believe that each initiative starts with a blank sheet, entirely unconstrained by what has gone before.
Accordingly, in this article we attempt to rescue a fairy-tale. The story of British
Airways is one of the most widely used inspirational accounts of changing culture.
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s it was used to demonstrate the necessary compatibility of pleasure and profits; 9 In the celebratory accounts, culture change is presented as the only explanation for the transformation that occurred. This corrective makes no attempt to deny the very substantial changes that took place in BA. Rather, i t s e t s t h e s e i n c o n t e x t n o t i n g t h e o r g a n i s a t i o n ' s e n v i r o n me n t a t t h e t i me o fthe transformation, the structural changes that took place and observing the impact that such changes had over the long term.
10,11
Managing Culture: Promises and Problems
In many respects, managing culture is peculiarly susceptible to being presented as a corporate fiction. While other management initiatives seek to promote positive a t t i t u d e s b y i n c r e a s i n g e mp l o y e e s ' a r e a o f r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t h r o u g h e mp o we r me n t aligning their financial interests with those of the organisation through adjustments to the payme n t s y s t e m o r d e mo n s t r a t i n g a n o r g a n i s a t i o n a l c o mmi t me n t t o i t s ' h u ma n a s s e t s ' b y i n v e s t i n g i n t r a i n i n g , c u l t u r a l c h a n g e t a r g e t s e mp l o y e e a t t i t u d e s d i r e c t l y a n d a i ms t o s e c u r e ' c o mmi t me n t ' r a t h e r t h a n ' r e s i g n e d b e h a v i o u r a l c o mp l i a n c e ' 12 with all employees s h a r i n g a ' c o mmo n v i s i o n ' a n d wo r k i n g t o g e t h e r f o r t h e g o o d o f t h e organisation.
As a result, the managerial task becomes one that involves establishing control over t h e me a n i n g o f wo r k , r a t h e r t h a n i t s e x e c u t i o n , o f ' c o n v e r t i n g ' e mp l o y e e s t o t h e corporat e ' f a i t h ' . I n t h e wo r d s o f P e t e r s a n d Wa t e r ma n 13 ma n a g e r s ' j o b s b e c o me " mo r e f u n . I n s t e a d o f b r a i n g a me s i n t h e s t e r i l e i v o r y t o we r , i t ' s s h a p i n g v a l u e s a n d
reinforcing through coaching and evangelism in the field -with the worker in support of the cheri s h e d p r o d u c t " . Wh e n t h e ma n a g e r i a l t a s k i s t o i n s p i r e a n d e n t h u s e , i t f o l l o ws t h a t , i f ma n a g e me n t a c a d e mi c s a r e ma n a g e me n t ' s a d v o c a t e s a n d a p o l o g i s t s their task is to provide prescriptions, exemplars and celebrations. Such accounts exist to provoke an emotional response and provide a spur to action and, to fulfil these functions, must necessarily describe productive interventions. In this narrative tradition management fads and fashions can only succeed.
So, not only is culture as a topic particularly likely to be represented as fiction, but also management writers may see their role as essentially celebratory. For those who read case studies to be inspired and enthused this combination is probably welcome.
Others, who seek to understand the way organisations function, assess the impact of interventions on employees, consider how structural and strategic factors combine, or even (through their writing) contribute towards a wider, emancipatory agenda; prefer accounts that do not automatically seek to report triumphs. In these, the management of culture is depicted as something rather more complex than a 'magic wand', ' s u c c e s s e s ' a r e mo r e t h a n c o u n t e r -balanced by initiatives with mixed or negative results and interventions are not assumed to be permanent 'fixes'. 14, 15 Occasionally the failures of culture management programmes are comic, Collinson 16 a r g u e s t h a t ma n y o f t h e i n i t i a t i v e s d e s i g n e d b y o n e B r i t i s h f a c t o r y ' s ( n e w, Ame r i c a n ) management served only to inspire shop-floor humour including stigmatising the c o mp a n y n e ws l e t t e r a s ' Go e b e l ' s Ga z e t t e ' . Ha mp e r ' s 17 account of his time at General Significantly each of these references differs from the celebrations in their willingness t o b e l i e v e t h a t c u l t u r e ' s i mp a c t o n e mp l o y e e s i s n o t a u t o ma t i c a l l y p o s i t i v e . T h i s i s not to argue that cultural interventions are never welcomed. Kunda 21 Casey 22 and
Grugulis et al. 23 all describe environments in which enthusiastic staff welcomed the management of culture (though in both cases the impact of this was problematic).
Wa t s o n ' s 24 managers v i e we d Z C T ' s c o r p o r a t e c u l t u r e c h a n g e s wi t h a mi x t u r e o f h o p e and scepticism; and Storey 25 notes that, while little sympathy was forthcoming from the shop floor, several line managers were supportive.
Going beyond the prescriptive accounts to understand organisations also raises is being re-defined in emotional rather than productive terms. 27, 28, 29 In practice, of course, the link between a unitary culture and corporate profits is elusive. Indeed, not only is the failure of organisations actively engaged in culture management and high commitment work practices notable, but also anti-managerial cultures seem just as capable of fostering high levels of output as more consensual ones. 30 Nor are fairy stories particularly helpful to managers. They may inspire and enthuse but, as the evidence shows, the product of this enthusiasm is rarely successful. Here, by exploring both success and failure realistically we hope to provide more achievable (of less ambitious) targets for 'managing culture'.
The British Airways Story
Even by the standards of modern management myths the British Airways transformation is impressive. At the end of the 1970s and the start of the 1980s BA was performing disastrously against almost every indicator. An old fleet made for u n c o mf o r t a b l e j o u r n e y s a n d c o n t r i b u t e d s i g n i f i c a n t l y t o t h e a i r l i n e ' s r e c o r d f o r unpunctuality its productivity was considerably below that of its main overseas competitors it was beset by industrial disputes; and it was recording substantial financial losses (£140 million or some £200 a minute in 1981). It seemed that staff discontent was more than matched by customer disatisfaction and in 1980 a survey by t h e I n t e r n a t i o n a l Ai r l i n e P a s s e n g e r s
' As s o c i a t i o n p u t B A a t t h e t o p o f a l i s t o f a i r l i n e s
to be avoided at all costs By 1996 this picture was reversed. Not only had BA b e c o me t h e wo r l d ' s mo s t p r o f i t a b l e carrier, it was also voted the company that most graduates would like to work for and, by the year 2000, another survey declared it the second most admired company in Europe. 31, 32, 33, 34, 35 Much of the management literature attributes this turnaround to B A' s o wn c u l t u r a l change which remodelled staff attitudes and set customer care as the primary focus of activity. As Doyle 36 noted:
In the 80s BA had been transformed from a disastrous loss-making state enterprise -the British Rail of the sky -into the world's largest and most profitable international airline. It was a triumph for management, showing that Britain could produce world-class companies that could beat the best of the competition. Its success was the result of the process and strategy that management introduced. The process focused on creating a vision that would inspire the BA staff and gain their enthusiastic commitment.
I t i s c e r t a i n l y t r u e t h a t a g r e a t d e a l o f e f f o r t a n d e n e r g y we n t i n t o s h a p i n g B A' s
culture. At the heart of this was t h e ' Putting People First' t r a i n i n g p r o g r a mme l a u n c h e d b y C o l i n Ma r s h a l l , t h e c o mp a n y ' s n e w c h i e f e x e c u t i v e , i n De c e mb e r 1 9 8 3 .
Originally intended for staff who had direct contact with customers it was, in fact, attended by all 40,000 employees by 1986 and it aimed to revolutionise their attitudes.
In a direct challenge to the hierarchical and militaristic culture which existed in BA at the time, staff were instructed not to attend in uniform and, once on the course, put into cross-functional and cross-grade groups. The course itself was consciously designed to modify behaviour. Attendees were encouraged to take a more positive attitude to themselves, taught how to set personal goals and cope with stress and i n s t r u c t e d i n c o n f i d e n c e b u i l d i n g a n d ' g e t t i n g wh a t t h e y wa n t e d o u t o f l i f e ' . L a p e l badges inscribed with the motto "We're putting people first" provided a visible reminder of the course's message.
The approach was self-c o n c i o u s l y " i n d o c t r i n a t i v e " . helped to deliver breakfasts to customers. 41 In his presence all of the symbols of the 'new culture' were expected to be in place -even down to the PPF lapel badges. Staff not wearing one of these had replacements pinned in place and Colin Marshall wore his own PPF badge for two years.
42

B u t t h e mo s t i mp r e s s i v e a s p e c t o f B A' s c u l t u r a l c h a n g e i s n o t s o mu c h t h e
sophistication of the PPF programme itself, nor the commitment of executive time, but the extent to which other employment policies and practices were changed to fit t h e ' n e w' c u l t u r e a n d t h e c o n t i n u e d e mp h a s i s o n t h e s e p r a c t i c e s a n d p r o g r a mme s throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Three-quarters of the one hundred Customer First teams, formed to propagate the message of PPF, survived into the 1990s. Not only were team briefings and team working introduced but these were developed and refined with TQM, autonomous team working and multi-skilling introduced in many areas. Direct contact with all staff was consi d e r e d s o i mp o r t a n t t h a t ' d o wn r o u t e '
briefings were developed to ensure that mobile and isolated staff were not neglected and in March 1996 BA became the first company to make daily TV broadcasts to its staff.
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The way cabin crew were rostered was also c h a n g e d . ' F a mi l i e s ' o f s t a f f we r e c r e a t e d to work the same shift patterns. These were intended to provide mutual support, make cabin crew feel happier about their work environments and, as a result, facilitate the production of emotional labour. 44 A new r o l e o f ' P a s s e n g e r Gr o u p C o -o r d i n a t o r ' wa s introduced and staff appointed based entirely on personal qualities. The importance of emotional processes was also reflected in the new appraisal and reward systems such that work was judged on the way in which it was performed as well as against harder targets. 45,46 Managerial bonuses could be as much as 20 per cent of salary and were calculated on a straight 50:50 split between exhibiting desired behaviours and achieving quantitative goals. Awards for Excellence and an Employee Brainwaves p r o g r a mme e n c o u r a g e d s t a f f i n p u t . T h e P e r s o n n e l De p a r t me n t wa s r e n a me d ' Hu ma n R e s o u r c e s ' wi t h ma n y d e c i s i o n s d e v o l v e d t o l i n e ma n a g e r s a n d , i n t h e f i r s t f e w y e a r s of the programme at least, a commitment was made to job security.
Closely following these developments, a Managing People First programme targeted managerial employees and aimed to bring their behaviours into line with a list developed by two consultancy firms (see table 2 ). As on PPF, the emphasis on this five-day course was on quasi-group therapy and experiential exercises. Outward bound courses were also intended to support the re-shaping of personality and the small groups formed on these residential programmes were expected to act as mutual support vehicles once back in the workplace. Not only can much of the BA turnaround be attributed to structural factors, but also t h e e x t e n t o f t h e c o mp a n y ' s c u ltural transformation itself is open to question. Hö p f l ' s ( 1 9 9 3 ) a c c o u n t o f B r i t i s h Ai r wa y s ma n a g e r s i n t h e ' n e w' c u l t u r e r e v e a l s hostility and uncertainty as well as enthusiasm. Further, despite the claims of the prescriptive literature, the existence of 'culture management' does not ensure either that employees trust management, or that management trusts employees. So, in BA,
' n e w' ma n a g e me n t p r a c t i c e s v a r i e d i n t h e e x t e n t t h a t t h e y we r e i n t r o d u c e d i n
departments and conflict between employees and management did not cease. Even at the point at which the company's unified culture was being heralded as a success at least one bargaining group a year ended up in dispute with it.
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Nor was the much vaunted job security quite as robust as it seemed. Alliances, mergers and franchising agreements with other airlines already supported what was, in effect a 'tiered' system of terms and conditions with employees based at Heathrow privileged over those in the regional airports. This emphasis on part-time, seasonal and sub-contracted work was extended to most aspects of BA's operations. Its engine overhaul plant was sold off to GEC, data processing work was moved to Bombay, and job security for existing staff questioned . 60, 61, 62 And all this at a time when BA was making record profits.
So, to re-cast our fairy-tale in rather more prosaic terms, BA, while clearly putting a
g r e a t d e a l o f e f f o r t i n t o e n c o u r a g i n g c e r t a i n b e h a v i o u r s f r o m ( o r ' d e s i g n i n g ' ) s t a f f d i d
not base its employment policies and practices around the new culture in the way that many accounts suggest. Their array of 'soft' human resource management techniques was certainly impressive but not everyone benefitted from them and those employed in partner, assoicate, merged or taken-over firms often experienced very different terms and conditions to the 'core' BA staff.
Nor is it fair to conclude, as many accounts do, with optimism about staff reactions to 'culture change'. There was enthusiasm and acceptance certainly, but there was also By the end of the 1990s many of the structural factors that had provided the basis for t h e c o mp a n y ' s s u c c e s s we r e u n d e r t h r e a t . T h e e me r g e n c e o f l o w c o s t c a r r i e r s s u c h as E a s y j e t a n d R y a n a i r we r e u n d e r c u t t i n g B A' s p r i c e s a n d , e l s e wh e r e , a l l i a n c e s b e t we e n rivals Lufthansa and United Airlines ensured that cross national traffic would be less This policy of reducing labour costs was also extended to 'core' BA staff. In early 1997, BA attempted to change the structure of payments to cabin crew. It was
p r o p o s e d t h a t t h e e x i s t i n g e mp l o y e e s wo u l d b e ' b o u g h t o u t ' o f t h e i r s e r i e s o f
allowances (petrol, overnight stay etc) by receiving a higher basic wage. BA offered a three year guarantee that no crew member would earn less under the new system but nothing beyond that and it was clear to cabin crew staff that the measure was launched with the explicit aim of saving money. When these negotiations failed, one union, the TGWU, threatened strike action (Cabin Crew 89, a small breakaway union,
h a d a l r e a d y a c c e p t e d ma n a g e me n t ' s o f f e r ) . De s p i t e f o u r t e e n y e a r s o f ' i n d o c t r i n a t i o n ' i n t o c a r i n g f o r o n e a n o t h e r a n d p u t t i n g p e o p l e f i r s t , t h e t a c t i c s d e p l o y e d b y B A' s management were described by two such different sources as the TUC and The
Economist as bullying. 65, 66 Members of the cabin crew were warned not to strike and BA managers were instructed to tell discontented staff that anyone taking industrial action would be summarily sacked, then sued for damages. Any who simply stayed away would face disciplinary action, be denied promotion, and lose both pension rights and staff discounts on flights for three years. BA were also reported to be filming pickets.
The subsequent strike ballot had an 80 per cent turnout with 73 per cent of employees voting in favour of strike action. The TGWU called a series of 72-hour strikes with the first action scheduled for 9th July 1997. In response, temporary staff and an a l t e r n a t i v e wo r k f o r c e o f ' v o l u n t e e r ma n a g e r s ' we r e g i v e n a ( p r o b a b l y i n a d e q u a t e )
training to perform the key tasks of the ground handling staff and BA threatened to take legal action over claimed discrepancies in the ballot. On the eve of the first day of action airline cabin crew were telephoned at home and warned that 'they had a duty to co-operate with their employer'.
These managerial actions certainly influenced the impact of the strike. On the first scheduled day of action less than three hundred workers declared themselves o f f i c i a l l y o n s t r i k e b u t mo r e t h a n 2 , 0 0 0 c a l l e d i n s i c k . T h e c o mp a n y ' s t h r e a t s a n d
' r e p l a c e me n t wo r k e r s ' n o t wi t h s t a n d i n g mo r e t h a n 7 0 p e r c e n t o f f l i g h t s f r o m
He a t h r o w we r e c a n c e l l e d .
I t s e e me d t h a t B A' s ma c h o a p p r o a c h h a d e n s u r e d o n l y t h a t
collective action took the form of collective illness.
Ironically this 'mass sickie' served to make things worse for BA. Not only did the prestrike ballots (conducted to comply with legislation designed to discourage union activities) compound the effects of the strike by providing customers with advance notice of it; but also those employees who had called in sick tended to stay away longer than the official 72-hour strike. BA insisted that sick employees provide a d o c t o r ' s n o t e wi t h i n 4 8 h o u r s i n s t e a d o f t h e n o r ma l seven days but many employees still stayed off for the full two weeks that their sick notes allowed and, throughout this period, services were cancelled and passengers turned away. The strike was costly.
Airline seats are a particularly perishable form of consumer good and aircraft scheduling is easily disrupted. When Bill Morris, the General Secretary of the TGWU announced that he had written to Bob Ayling, suggesting that they resume negotiations, Ayling agreed before even receiving the letter.
The TGWU promised to save £42 million over three years. Catering was sold off but existing staff kept earnings and BA staff discounts, while sanctions against strikers were withdrawn and the TGWU increased its membership by 50 per cent to over 10,000. BA's management fared less well, despite Bob Ayling's claim that this agreement marked a 'new beginning and spirit of a co-operation'. The gulf between the managerial rhetoric on culture and official actions during the strike had a predictable effect on employee morale. One undercover employee publication, aptly named Chaos advised on ways of maximising payments by delaying aircraft. These included throwing duvet feathers into the engine, superglueing down the toilet seat a n d p o i s o n i n g t h e p i l o t : " a p a r t i c u l a r ly obnoxious captain can be made to suffer all the symptoms of violent food poisoning by emptying eye drops from the aircraft medical k i t i n t o h i s s a l a d o r d r i n k " .
Moreover, the agreement itself fostered further dissent. 4,000 staff left by the end of 1997 but 4,500 more were recruited including 2,000 in 1998. By the terms of the agreement, these new staff were employed on different contracts to existing employees. As a result, cabin crew working the same shifts on the same aircraft were (increasingly) on different payscales. The impact of this on both labour relations and B A' s mu c h p r i z e d t e a mwo r k i n g wa s p r o b l e ma t i c a n d p r o b l e ms we r e f u e l l e d b y
suggestions that staff on new contracts were favoured by BA in promotion to purser (first line manager).
Bob Ayling attempted to salvage the situation by placing more emphasis on managing t h e c o mp a n y ' s c u l t u r e . 
Conclusions and Discussion
Re-p r e s e n t i n g o u r f a i r y s t o r y i n c a s e s t u d y f o r ma t s h o ws t h e c o mp a n y ' s t u r n a r o u n d i n a different light with international agreements, competition with other airlines, the state of the fleet and the network of links between flights making a contribution to improved performance that was as least as significant as the cultural change programme itself. It is difficult to believe that, without these structural interventions BA's profits would have risen in the way that they did. 67 Equally, the structural improvements may have served to enhance the cultural messages just as Bob Ayling's "Chicago-style union busting macho management" (George Galloway) 68 made his seem hypocritical. As Grugulis et al 69 argue in their study of a consultancy firm, it is naïve to assume that practices which are effective when companies are successful will be equally welcome at other times. Employees do not 'react' to the management of culture in isolation, nor does a 'positive' cultural rhetoric negate problematic experiences of job design, dis-empowerment, payment systems or control mechanisms. Rather, responses will be influenced by a person's experience of work as a whole and employees are more than capable of noting discrepancies between managerial promises and organisational practice.
This is not to suggest that BA's cultural change was unimportant. Indeed, the move to ' d e s i g n ' e mp l o y e e s , t o s h a p e t h e wa y t h e y t h i n k a n d f e e l a b o u t t h e i r wo r k r a t h e r t h a n simply control what they produce is a new development. A growing service sector and an increasing focus on customer service in all industries has resulted in an emphasis on the service process (of which the employee is an integral part) rather than a manufactured product. Clearly such a development has and will lead to fundamental changes in the way work is shaped. But these changes are not attempts to make work "more fun". 
